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WALKING THE LINE OF ADMISSIBILI1Y: WHY MARYLAND 
COURTS SHOULD REEXAMINE THE ADMISSIBILI1Y OF FIELD 
SOBRIE1Y TESTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In what was one of the earliest reported instances involving expert 
testimony, a Dr. Brown of Norwich took the stand in 1665. 1 Dr. 
Brown offered the expert scientific opinion that the accused women 
were witches and, by practicing their witchcraft, they had bewitched 
many children.2 There was no challenge as to the validity of the ex-
pert scientific testimony, and the defendants were found guilty and 
hanged.3 In 2005, witchcraft is no longer the problem facing Ameri-
can society that it was in the 1660's. Still, scientific testimony, albeit 
more sophisticated than that mentioned above, is an important tool 
relied upon by courts to combat society's problems, including driving 
under the influence of alcohol. 
An estimated thirty percent of Americans will be involved in an al-
cohol- related automobile accident at some point in their lives.4 Ac-
cording to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
("NHTSA"), almost 18,000 citizens per year, or nearly fifty people per 
day, are killed as a result of accidents involving impaired drivers.5 
Aside from the cost in human life, the economic effects of such acci-
dents are large as well, as the estimated cost to the public caused by 
these crashes in 2000 was $114.7 billion.6 In response to these statis-
tics, every state has criminalized impaired driving. 7 
In January of 2002, the United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland decided United States v. Hom, a case in which the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were applied to Maryland's drunk driving law.s Par-
1. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385 n.7, 391 A.2d 364,370 n.7 (1978) (citing A 
Trial of Witches at Bury St. Edmonds, 6 Howell's State Trials 687, 697 (1665». 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Mothers Against Drunk Driving [hereinafter MADD], Drunk Driving in the 
United States, at http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,3726,00.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2005). The MADD Web site cites a National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration study from the year 2000 as the source of this 
information. 
5. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Stop Impaired Driving, at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov / people/injury/alcohol! stopimpaired/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2005). 
6. See supra note 4. 
7. The MADD Web site has a link that allows the reader to access the drunk 
driving laws for a majority of states, which can be found at http://www3. 
madd.org/laws/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
8. United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002). 
365 
366 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
ticularly, these Rules were applied to the use of Standardized Field 
Sobriety Tests and the admissibility of the results of these tests at tria1.9 
As a result of the holding of Horn, two approaches now exist gov-
erning the admissibility of field sobriety tests in Maryland, depending 
upon whether the case is tried in federal or state court. 1O In order to 
understand the existing dichotomy, it is essential to examine the his-
torical development of the admissibility of scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge given in the form of expert testimony. 
Part II of this comment will examine the two competing approaches 
governing the reliability of scientific techniques and their admissibility 
as evidence. Part III will discuss the three field sobriety tests that 
make up the Standardized Field Sobriety Test battery. Part IV of this 
comment illustrates the treatment by Maryland and federal courts of 
testimony relating to the field sobriety tests under the applicable evi-
dentiary standard. Finally, Parts V and VI will show that the federal 
court was correct in its analysis of the field sobriety tests, and that 
Maryland courts would be wise to reconsider taking judicial notice of 
the reliability of the field sobriety tests. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Maryland Law and the Frye/Reed Standard 
In 1923, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia consid-
ered the admissibility of the testimony of an expert witness as to the 
results of a systolic blood pressure deception test in Frye v. United 
StatesY In affirming the trial court's ruling that the testimony was 
inadmissible, the court of appeals established a common law doctrine 
governing the admissibility of expert testimony regarding scientific 
principles. 12 The court held: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, and while 
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
9. Id. 
10. In Horn, the defendant was stopped at the entrance of the Anny facility at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, which is located in Maryland but subject to fed-
eral jurisdiction. See Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 532. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence are applicable in cases tried under the Assimilative Crimes Act. 
Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476,479 (4th Cir. 1958) (interpreting the 
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13). 
11. 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test was a primitive sort of polygraph examination, based on the pre-
mise that "conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of facts, or guilt 
of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under exam-
ination" would result in a rise in the test subject's blood pressure. Id. at 
1013. 
12. Id. at 1014. 
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duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in 
the particular field in which it belongs.13 
367 
Simply put, the Frye court established a rule that expert testimony re-
garding scientific information would only be admissible if the method 
used to deduce the information is established and generally accepted 
within the particular scientific field in question. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the Frye approach in the 
1978 case Reed v. State. 14 Reed addressed the trial court's admission of 
voice identification testimony based on spectrogram analysis, com-
monly known as "voiceprints."15 The trial court ruled the analysis ad-
missible after hearing testimony regarding the general validity and 
reliability of this method of identification. 16 
In determining the proper standard to analyze the admissibility of 
scientific evidence, the Court of Appeals began its analysis by discuss-
ing the reliability of the techniques used to deduce such evidenceP 
The court concluded that if the reliability of a technique cannot be 
judicially noted, it must be demonstrated to the court before testi-
mony based on this evidence can be introduced at trial. 18 Instead of 
placing the determination of the "threshold question" regarding the 
reliability of testimony within the discretion of each trial judge, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the standard from Frye v. United 
States as the test to determine the reliability of a scientific technique.19 
Thus, according to the Reed Court, "if a new scientific technique's va-
lidity is in controversy in the relevant scientific community, or if it is 
generally regarded as an experimental technique, then expert testi-
13. [d. Upholding the trial court's refusal to admit the test results, the court 
stated that the "test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recogni-
tion among physiological and psychological authorities as would justifY the 
courts in admitting expert testimony." [d. 
14. 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364,367-68 (1978). 
15. [d. at 375, 377, 391 A.2d at 364-66. The defendant in this case had been 
convicted of "rape, unnatural and perverted sex acts, robbery, verbal 
threats, and unlawful use of the telephone." [d. at 377, 391 A.2d at 365. 
The convictions were based in part on the prosecution's use of spectro-
graphic analysis and comparison of recorded phone conversations between 
the victim and the defendant and voice exemplars of the defendant made 
while he was in custody. [d. at 376, 391 A.2d at 365. 
16. [d. at 377, 391 A.2d at 365. 
17. [d. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367 (stating that "the validity and reliability of a 
scientific technique may be so broadly and generally accepted in the scien-
tific community that a trial court may take judicial notice of its reliability."). 
18. [d. This demonstration will usually be done through testimony, but a court 
can take notice of law journals, scientific journals, and other publications. 
[d. 
19. [d. at 381, 391 A.2d at 367-68 (quoting Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 
1923» . 
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mony based upon its validity cannot be admitted into evidence."2o If a 
technique has gained acceptance in the scientific community, testi-
mony regarding the results of the test using this technique may be 
introduced into evidence only after the trial judge determines that the 
proposed testimony will be helpful to the fact-finder, and the expert is 
properly qualified.21 The Reed Court held the results of these tests 
inadmissible because of an existing disagreement in the scientific 
community on the reliability of voiceprinting.22 
B. Federal Law and the Rule 702/Daubert/Kumho Tires Standard 
Until 1993, the standard in federal courts governing the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony deduced from the application of scientific tech-
niques was the "general acceptance" test articulated in Frye v. United 
States and adopted by Maryland courts in Reed v. State.23 In that year, 
however, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the in-
terplay of the Frye general acceptance standard and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.24 Because the Court held that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence superseded Frye, any analysis of the Court's holding must begin 
with an examination of the applicable rule. 25 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads in full: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testi-
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods relia-
bly to the facts of the case.26 
Because Rule 702 directly addressed the issue decided in Frye, the 
Daubert Court reasoned: 
Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of 
a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention 
20. Reed, 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368. 
21. [d. at 389, 391 A.2d at 372. 
22. [d. at 399-400, 391 A.2d at 377. The case was remanded for a new trial, but 
the court pointed out that the holding would be subject to reconsideration 
should "voiceprinting" become generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity subsequent to the ruling. [d. 
23. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). Before 
articulating the new federal standard, the Court wrote that "[iJn the 70 
years since its formulation in the Frye case, the 'general acceptance' test has 
been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence at triaL" [d. 
24. [d. at 582-83, 586-87. 
25. [d. at 587. 
26. FED. R. EVlD. 702. 
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"'general acceptance,''' the assertion that the Rules some-
how assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made "general ac-
ceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific 
testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incom-
patible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be 
applied in federal trials. 27 
369 
In other words, the Court held that Frye no longer applied in federal 
cases. 
Mter announcing its ruling in Daubert, the Court went step-by-step 
through the new requirements that must be met for scientific evi-
dence to be reliable in accordance with Rule 702.28 The first step of 
analysis under Daubert is that the subject of the testifying expert's attes-
tations must be "scientific."29 In order to qualifY as scientific knowl-
edge, an inference or assertion must come from utilizing the scientific 
method.30 The second consideration a federal court must undertake 
is whether the proposed testimony will "assist the trier of fact to un-
derstand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," or, simply put, 
whether the testimony is relevantY 
In determining whether these two considerations are met, the 
Daubert Court gave a list of observations that may aid a trial judge.32 
The first factor on the Daubert "checklist" used to determine whether 
the technique used by the expert is scientific is whether the technique 
"can be (and has been) tested."33 Next, a trial court judge can con-
sider whether the technique or theory has been subjected to peer re-
view, either through publication or some other means.34 The known 
or potential error rate of the method should also be considered.35 
Finally, the Court stated that general acceptance can also be a factor 
in this determination.36 The Court summarized its analysis by stating 
that a Rule 702 inquiry should be flexible, and that the focus should 
27. 509 U.S. at 589. The "permissive backdrop" of the Rules referred to by the 
Court refers to the liberal standard of relevance established by the Rules. 
See id. at 587; see also FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. 
28. 509 U.S. at 589-95. 
29. Id. at 589-90. The Court also acknowledged that under the language of the 
Rule, "technical, or other specialized knowledge" also applies, but noted 
that its discussion was limited to the scientific context. Id. at 590 n.8. 
30. Id. at 590. 
31. Id. at 591; see also FED. R. EVID. 702; U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 
(3d. Cir. 1985) (stating that "[a]n additional consideration under Rule 
702-and another aspect of relevancy-is whether expert testimony prof-
fered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the 
jury in resolving a factual dispute"). 
32. 509 U.S. at 592-94. The Court noted that this "checklist" is not definitive. 
Id. at 593. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 593-94. 
35. Id. at 594. 
36. Id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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be on principles and methodology, not the conclusions formed 
therefrom.37 
To complete a Federal Rule of Evidence 702 analysis, one must next 
look to Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.38 Here, the Supreme Court ex-
tended the standard articulated in Daubert to apply to testimony based 
on "'technical' and 'other specialized knowledge,'" thereby ex-
panding applicability of the doctrine over virtually all expert testi-
mony.39 The Court then clarified the list of factors enunciated in 
Daubert, noting that they may not apply "to all experts or in every 
case."40 The Court further asserted that the trial court will have 
"broad latitude" in deciding both how to determine reliability and ul-
timately deciding if this process is satisfied, thus making the testimony 
reliable.41 The Court concluded its holding in Kumho Tire by stating 
that "Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, 
reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particu-
lar facts and circumstances of the particular case."42 
In order to understand how these competing approaches are ap-
plied in drunk driving cases, one must first become familiar with the 
standardized field sobriety tests to which the above-mentioned eviden-
tiary standards are applied. 
III. THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
A. The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test 
Nystagmus describes an involuntary eye motion that can be exhib-
ited in two ways.43 The first is "pendular nystagmus, where the eye 
37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95. At issue in Daubert was the admissibility of stud-
ies linking the drug Bendectin to birth defects. Id. at 582-85. Because the 
lower courts had utilized the Frye "general acceptance" standard, the case 
was remanded. Id. at 597-98. 
38. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). At issue in Kumho was testimony by an expert in tire 
failure analysis in a diversity suit involving a car accident. Id. at 142. Be-
cause the expert was not a scientist, there was an issue as to whether Daubert 
applied. Id. at 141. 
39. Id. at 141-42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
40. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42. 
41. Id. at 142. The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding 
how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special 
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it en-
joys when it decides whether that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Id. 
at 152. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Daubert 
factors). 
42. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 158. The Court reversed the court of appeals' holding 
that the trial judge had abused his discretion in acting as a reliability "gate-
keeper." Id. at 145-46, 158. Therefore, the trial judge's conclusion that the 
tire expert's testimony was unreliable and should be excluded was affirmed. 
Id. 
43. James J. Dietrich, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: The Science & the Law: A Re-
source Guide for Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcement, Section I, at http:/ / 
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oscillates equally in two directions."44 The second is 'Jerk nystagmus, 
where the eye moves slowly away from a fix[ed] point and then is rap-
idly corrected."45 Horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN") is a type of jerk 
nystagmus.46 
Alcohol consumption causes alcohol gaze nystagmus, which in-
cludes HGN.47 When intoxicated, a person's smooth and accurate 
control of his or her eye movements will break down.48 The purpose 
of the HGN test is twofold: (1) to "identify drivers with [blood alcohol 
content] in the .08-.12 range that make up the bulk of the impaired 
drivers who do not necessarily exhibit exaggerated characteristics of 
impairment; and (2) [to] detect impairment in alcohol-tolerant driv-
ers who may not display any gross coordination and balance 
problems."49 
The HGN test is administered by requiring a subject to follow an 
object, "such as a pen or the tip of a penlight," with his or her eyes.50 
The administering officer will place the object above eye-level and 
about twelve to fifteen inches from the subject's face. 51 Next, the of-
ficer instructs the subject of the test to follow the object with his or her 
eyes only, and not move his or her head.52 The officer then conducts 
the test looking for three "clues" in each eye that HGN is present, 
which would indicate impairment.53 The clues are lack of smooth 
pursuit,54 distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation,55 and angle of 














www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/ enforce/ nystagmus/hgntxt.html (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
Id. 
Id. The study compares a normal eye to one with jerk nystagmus: "An eye 
normally moves smoothly like a marble rolling over a glass plane, whereas 
an eye with jerk nystagmus moves like a marble rolling across sandpaper." 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at Section II. Alcohol also causes positional alcohol nystagmus, which is 
not included in the field sobriety tests, and therefore will not be discussed 
further. Id. 
Id. 





Id. The officer slowly moves the object from the center of the subject's face 
towards the left ear, watching to see if the left eye will follow smoothly or 
exhibit nystagmus. Id. The process is then repeated with the right eye. Id. 
Id. The officer again moves the object toward the left ear, this time pausing 
at the point that the eye has gone as far to the side as possible. Id. The 
officer will hold the object here for about four seconds, looking to see if 
there is a "distinct and sustained nystagmus." Id. Again, the process is re-
peated with the right eye. Id. 
Id. In this test, the "officer moves the object at a speed that would take 
about four seconds" to go from the center of the face to the edge of the 
subject's left shoulder. Id. If the eye begins to exhibit nystagmus before 
372 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
are present, it is likely that the subject has a blood alcohol content 
("BAC") of at least .10.57 The HGN test is regarded as the most "scien-
tific" or "technical" of the field sobriety tests. 58 
B. The Walk and Turn Test 
The second part of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test battery is 
the Walk and Turn ("WAT") Test.59 The WAT test is a "divided atten-
tion" test, which, according to the NHTSA, can be performed easily by 
most unimpaired persons.5O During the test, the subject is instructed 
to take nine steps along a straight line in a heel-to-toe fashion. 61 Mter 
completing this, the suspect must then pivot on one foot and do the 
same in the opposite direction.62 In the WAT test there are eight in-
dicators of impairment: failing to maintain balance while listening to 
instructions, beginning the test before the instructions are completed, 
stopping during walking to maintain or regain balance, failing to walk 
in a heel-to-toe manner, stepping off of the line, using arms for bal-
ance, making an improper turn, or taking an improper number of 
steps.63 Research indicates that seventy-nine percent of those exhibit-
ing two or more of the above indicators will have a BAC of .08 or 
greater.64 
C. The One-Leg Stand Test 
The final test in the Standardized Field Sobriety Test trilogy is the 











the object reaches approximately forty-five degrees from the center of the 
face, a "clue" exists. Id. The process is repeated with the right eye. Id. 
See U.S. v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530,536-37 (D. Md. 2002). According to 
the manual, based on these test results, one would be able to correctly clas-
sify a suspect as intoxicated about seventy-seven percent of the time. Id. 
See id. 
See id. at 537. 
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFE'IY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DEVELOP-
MENT OF A STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIE'IY TEST (SFST) TRAINING MANAGE-
MENT SYSTEM, DOT HS 809 400, Appendix A (Nov. 2001), available at http:/ 
/www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol!sfst/appendix_a.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2005). The One-Leg Stand test is also considered a divided 
attention test. Id. The rationale behind these tests is that an impaired per-
son is likely to have difficulty dividing attention between simple physical 
and mental tasks. Id. See also infra notes 63-68 for discussion of the One-
Leg Stand test. 
See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFE'IY ADMIN., supra note 60, at Appendix A. 
Id. 
Id. The subject is also told to keep his arms at his side during the test. See 
Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFE'IY ADMIN., supra note 60, at Appendix A (cit-
ingJAcK STUSTER & MARCELLINE BURNS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., VALIDATION 
OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST BATTERY AT BACs BELOW 0.10 
PERCENT (1998), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/ 
alcohol! Archive/Limit.08/!SFSTREP.PDF) (August 1998)). 
Id. 
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foot off of the ground approximately six inches and count out loud by 
thousands.66 The subject will have to maintain this position for thirty 
seconds.67 In this test, there are four indicators of impairment.68 
These indicators are "swaying while balancing, using arms to balance, 
hopping to maintain balance, and putting the foot down" on the 
ground.69 Individuals exhibiting two or more of these indicators will, 
according to the NHTSA, have a BAC of .08 or higher eighty-three 
percent of the time.70 When the results of the Standard Field Sobriety 
Test are combined, the NHTSA states that officers accurately con-
clude a subject is intoxicated ninety-one percent of the time. 71 Obvi-
ously, the conclusions of the NHTSA alone are not enough to make 
the tests admissible in impaired driving trial, and courts around the 
country have approached the admissibility of the test results differ-
ently, coming to different conclusions as to their reliability.72 
IV. EVIDENTARY TREATMENT OF STANDARD FIELD SOBRIElY 
TESTS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL STANDARDS 
A. The Maryland Standard 
In Crampton v. State,73 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
held that the trial judge did not err in admitting an arresting officer's 
testimony regarding observations of a suspect's performance of field 
sobriety tests.74 The tests the defendant had to complete, however, 
were not all part of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test battery dis-
cussed above.75 The court limited the officer's testimony to telling the 
jury that the defendant was unable to perform the tests and was 
arrested. 76 
In 1995, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether the Frye/ 





70. Id. (citing STUSTER & BURNS, supra note 64). 
71. Id. (citing STUSTER & BURNS, supra note 64). Accuracy increases to ninety-
four percent if explanations for false positives are included. Id. (citing 
STUSTER & BURNS, supra note 64). 
72. See infra Section IV and accompanying text. 
73. 71 Md. App. 375, 525 A.2d 1087 (1987), aff'd, 314 Md. 265,550 A.2d 693 
(1988). 
74. Id. at 389,525 A.2d at 1094. The court ruled that the Frye/Reed standard did 
not have to be satisfied, as the officer's testimony was based on "essentially 
empirical observations, involving no controversial, new, or 'scientific' tech-
nique." Id. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1093-94. 
75. Id. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1093. The tests the officer required the suspect to 
complete were to "stand on one leg, recite the alphabet, and perform a 
heel-ta-toe test." Id. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test Battery. 
76. Crampton, 71 Md. App. at 387,525 A.2d at 1093. 
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garding an individual's performance on an HGN test to be admissi-
ble. 77 In Schultz v. State, the court ruled that a Frye/Reed foundation 
was required for the HGN test to be admissible. 78 The Court stated 
that "the HGN test, however, does not test a suspect's coordination or 
ability to recollect. It is based upon a scientific principle that the ex-
tent and manner in which one's eye quivers can be a reliable measure 
of the amount of alcohol one has consumed. "79 
The court then stated, however, that the results of HGN tests would 
be admissible without reference to the Frye/Reed standard, as the court 
took judicial notice of the test's reliability and acceptance.80 Under 
Maryland law, a court may take judicial notice of a fact if it is "not 
subject to reasonable dispute" and either "generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court," or "capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot rea-
sonably be questioned."81 The Schultz court used cases from other ju-
risdictions in taking judicial notice of the fact that the Standardized 
Field Sobriety Tests are reliable.82 
The court's judicial notice was somewhat qualified, however, as the 
State would still be required to show that the test was properly con-
ducted and given by a qualified officer.83 In 1999, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland further limited the doctrine by ruling that 
HGN tests cannot be used as proof of a specific BAC.84 
77. Schultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145,664 A.2d 60 (1995). 
78. Id. at 150-51, 664 A.2d at 62-63. 
79. Id. at 156, 664 A.2d at 65. 
80. [d. at 164-65, 664 A.2d at 69. The court stated: "We shall further hold, 
however, that the results of HGN tests are, nevertheless, admissible in the 
trial courts of this State without further reference to the Frye/Reed standard. 
We take judicial notice of the reliability and acceptance of the HGN test." 
Id. The court supported its holding that judicial notice can be taken in 
regard to the reliability of HGN tests by discussing cases from other jurisdic-
tions where HGN testing was found to be a reliable indicator of intoxica-
tion. See generally id. at 167-73, 664 A.2d at 71-74. 
81. MD. R. 5-201 (b). 
82. 106 Md. App. at 167-68, 664 A.2d at 71. The court stated: 
Id. 
Because the test is so frequently, even predominantly, used in a 
forensic setting, however, there is another, equally reliable, 
source-the holdings of other courts that have examined the 
question . 
. . . We can draw our own conclusions from the collection of hold-
ings of our sister (or brother) courts, including those mat have 
found a sufficient basis for taking judicial notice. 
83. [d. at 174, 664 A.2d at 74. The court wrote, "We take judicial notice that the 
results of HGN testing, if the test is properly given by a qualified officer, are 
admissible to indicate the presence of alcohol in a defendant." Id. The 
Court of Special Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in admitting the 
officer's testimony in Schultz, as a sufficient foundation was not established 
as to the officer's qualifications. Id. at 180, 664 A.2d at 77. 
84. Wilson v. State, 124 Md. App. 543, 554-56, 723 A.2d 494, 499-500 (1999). 
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B. The Federal Standard 
The federal standard governing the admissibility of the Standard-
ized Field Sobriety Tests was articulated by Magistrate Paul Grimm in 
United States v. Horn. 85 Magistrate Grimm first analyzed the admissibil-
ity of field sobriety tests as direct evidence of intoxication.86 Like Ma-
ryland courts, Magistrate Grimm held that using only the results of the 
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests is not enough to prove BAC levels.87 
The Horn analysis then turned to the question of whether the field 
sobriety test battery can be used as circumstantial evidence of intoxica-
tion.88 Similar to Maryland courts, Magistrate Grimm held that the 
tests can be used as circumstantial evidence of intoxication as long as 
they first meet the Rule 702 requirement of reliability as interpreted 
in the Daubert /Kuhmo Tire analysis.89 It is here that the holding in 
Horn began to diverge from Maryland law.90 
Next, Magistrate Grimm concluded that "the Standardized Field So-
briety Test evidence in this case does not, at this time, meet the re-
quirements of Daubert/Kumho Tire and Rule 702 as to be admissible as 
direct evidence of intoxication or impairment."91 Alternatively stated, 
the test cannot be used as direct evidence of a particular BAC, intoxi-
cation, or impairment in federal court. 
Another example of Magistrate Grimm's divergence from Maryland 
law is his treatment of the OLS and WAT tests. Like Maryland, Magis-
trate Grimm concluded that these two tests are merely "standardized 
procedures" used to make objective observations of coordination, 
speech, balance, concentration, ability to follow directions, physical 
85. 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002). 
86. Id. at 556. 
87. Id. See also supra note 83-84 and accompanying text. 
88. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 557. 
89. Id. at 557-58. See also Wilson, 124 Md. App. at 555, 723 A.2d at 499-500. 
90. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 557-58. Magistrate Grimm wrote: 
The state courts overwhelmingly have concluded that the results of 
SFSTs are admissible as circumstantial evidence of alcohol con-
sumption but have offered little guidance about what exactly the 
testirying officer may tell the fact finder about the SFSTs, their ad-
ministration, and the performance of the suspect when doing 
them. The possibilities range from simply describing the tests-
without explaining the scientific or technical bases underlying 
them or their claimed accuracy rates and describing only what the 
officer observed when they were performed, absent any opinions 
regarding whether the suspect "passed" or "failed" or assessment of 
the degree of intoxication or impairment-to a full explanation of 
the tests, their claimed accuracy, the number of "standardized 
clues" the suspect missed, and an opinion that the suspect "failed" 
the test-in short everything up to testimony about the specific 
BAC of the driver. 
Id. at 557. See also Wilson, 124 Md. App. at 554-55, 723 A.2d at 499-500. 
91. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 557. 
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condition, and mood.92 However, Magistrate Grimm's analysis went 
further in limiting the admissibility of these tests.93 Magistrate Grimm 
turned to the Florida District Court of Appeals for guidance.94 In 
State v. Meador,95 the Florida court wrote: 
While the psychomotor tests [OLS and WAT] are admissible, 
we agree with defendants that any attempt to attach signifi-
cance to defendants' performance on these exercises beyond 
that attributable to any of the other observations of a defen-
dant's conduct at the time of the arrest could be misleading 
to the jury and thus tip the scales so that the danger of unfair 
prejudice would outweigh its probative value. The likeli-
hood of unfair prejudice does not outweigh the probative 
value as long as the witnesses simply describe their 
observations.96 
Building upon this reasoning, Magistrate Grimm held that, when of-
fered as circumstantial evidence of alcohol ingestion, the probative 
value of any of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests comes from their 
nature as observations of behavior, and not scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge.97 Because of the nature of these tests, an of-
ficer's testimony is limited to describing the procedures used in ad-
ministering the test and observations as to the defendant's 
performance.98 In order to use terms such as 'test,' 'standardized 
clues,' 'pass' or 'fail,'" the test must satisfY the Rule 702/Daubert/ 
Kumho Tire standard; Magistrate Grimm concluded the test does not 
presently meet this standard.99 
Magistrate Grimm based his decision on many factors. He held that 
the evidence introduced by the defense in Horn as to the first two 
Daubert/Kumho Tire factors-the methods used to develop the tests 
and the error rates of the tests-leads to the conclusion that the test is 
not satisfied. lOo Therefore, this evidence must be analyzed. 
92. Id. at 558. Grimm wrote that "[iJf offered as circumstantial evidence of 
alcohol intoxication or impairment, the probative value of the SFSTs de-
rives from their basic nature as observations of human behavior, which is 
not scientific, technical or specialized knowledge." Id. at 559. Cf Crampton, 
supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
93. Like much of Magistrate Grimm's analysis, the underlying principle here is 
in agreement with Maryland law. He, however, seems to be more thorough 
in his discussion, thus resulting in a federal standard that is more restrictive 
as to the admissible testimony from an arresting officer in a DWI/DUI case. 
94. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
95. 674 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
96. Id. at 832. 
97. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 559. Magistrate Grimm extended the Meador 
court's approach to the psychomotor tests to all SFSTs, including the HGN 
test. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. See also supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
100. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
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The evidence showing the development of the tests was introduced 
by industrial psychologistJoel P. Wiesen, Ph.D.lOl Dr. Wiesen testified 
about the development of the tests by examining five reports discuss-
ing the sobriety exams. 102 The reports were as follows: a June 1977 
report prepared for the NHTSA titled "Psychophysical Tests for OWl 
Arrests" ("1977 Report");103 a March 1981 final report titled "Develop-
ment and Field Test of Psychophysical Tests for OWl Arrest" ("1981 
Report");104 a September 1983 field evaluation titled "Field Evaluation 
of a Behavioral Test Battery for OWl," ("1983 Report");105 a Novem-
ber 1995 study of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests titled "A Colo-
rado Validation Study of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST) 
Battery," (the "1995 Report");106 and an undated study titled "A Flor-
ida Validation Study of the Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST) 
Battery" ("Florida Report") .107 
Dr. Wiesen was "highly critical" of the studies mentioned above. lOS 
Six specific problems were cited with the 1977 Report. lOg Dr. Wiesen 
also cited eight concerns with the 1981 Report,110 seven problems 
with the 1983 Report,Ill five with the 1995 Report,1l2 and three with 
101. [d. at 542. Dr. Wiesen had ten years experience working for the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts developing civil service examinations and ten more 
years as an independent consultant in test development and validation. !d. 
His testimony is summarized in a table found at pages 542-43. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. at 535-36. The report was prepared by Marcelline Burns, Ph.D., who has 
commonly been used by the prosecution as an expert in DWI/DUI cases, 
and Herbert Moskowitz, Ph.D., both of the Southern California Research 
Institute [hereinafter SCRI]. [d. at 535-36 & n.14. 
104. [d. at 536. Dr. Burns and SCRI prepared this report for the NHTSA. [d. 
105. [d. Theodore E. Anderson, Robert M. Schweitz and Monroe B. Snyder pre-
pared this study. [d. 
106. [d. The report was prepared by Dr. Burns and the Pitkin County (Colo-
rado) Sheriffs Office and was funded by the NHTSA. [d. 
107. [d. Dr. Burns and the Pinellas County (Florida) Sheriff's Office prepared 
this report. [d. 
108. [d. at 542. 
109. [d. The problems cited were the following: 1) a chin rest was used in the 
lab tests, which was not done in the field; 2) a single set of data was used, 
artificially inflating scores; 3) the tests were not age and gender neutral; 4) 
the lab tests were monitored to ensure they were correctly performed, 
which was not done in the field; 5) scoring was not adjusted to reflect dif-
ferences in results based on the time of day the HGN test was conducted; 
and 6) the fact that "the study was not peer reviewed, and would not have 
been accepted if offered." [d. 
110. [d. They were as follows: 1) very high error rates; 2) no adjustment to re-
flect effects of time of day on HGN testing; 3) low test/retest reliability 
rates; 4) testing officers not basing decisions on SFST results; 5) possible 
bias; 6) fifty percent of suspects arrested had a BAC below legal limit; 7) 
officers used in study were not representative of all officers; and 8) reports 
that in the field some officers entirely forgot or ignored standardized pro-
cedures. [d. 
Ill. [d. They were as follows: 1) the professional standards of the testing com-
munity were not met; 2) a failure to monitor data collection; 3) arrests 
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the Florida Report. 11 3 Dr. Wiesen concluded, "[I]n light of the spe-
cific critiques above (which are not exhaustive), I can only conclude 
that the field sobriety tests do not meet reasonable professional and 
scientific standards."114 
Dr. Wiesen's testimony casts serious doubt on the methods used in 
the development of the tests. The testimony of another expert for the 
defense discussed the error rates of the field sobriety tests. Analyzing 
the same studies as Dr. Wiesen, Harold P. Brull, a licensed psycholo-
gist, observed that there was a "complete absence of evidence 'which 
would allow one to predict a known error rate in the field. "'115 Brull 
concluded that if the error rates of the field sobriety tests were known, 
they "likely would have been unacceptable in real world situations."116 
The testimony on the methods used to develop the field sobriety test 
battery and the error rates of the tests led Magistrate Grimm to hold 
that the tests were unreliable under a Daubm/Kumho Tire analysis for 
proving a specific BAC.117 
Another key factor to Magistrate Grimm's holding was the possible 
causes of HGN other than intoxication. II8 The Schultz court ruled 
that, to offset the possible alternative explanations to HGN, the trial 
court must ensure that "the proper precautions were taken or the 
proper considerations were accounted for prior to the administration 
of the test itself."119 Magistrate Grimm's holding in Hom, however, 
made due to results of breath tests made it impossible to tell what the ar-
resting decision was based upon; 4) a failure to report twenty-five percent 
of the data; 5) no statistical tests were performed on the data; 6) the tests 
were not administered in standard fashion; and 7) the accuracy of the data 
was suspect. Id. 
112. Id. They were as follows: 1) the report was too incomplete to draw conclu-
sions on the test's validity; 2) sections of the report were missing; 3) possi-
ble bias; 4) no monitoring of data collection; and 5) unclear results based 
on two different arrest standards. Id. 
113. Id. They were as follows: 1) the report was incomplete; 2) the methodology 
was not described in the report; and 3) the data was incompletely de-
scribed. Id. 
114. Id. at 543. 
115. Id. at 543-44. 
116. Id. at 544. 
117. [d. at 556. Magistrate Grimm reached this conclusion without considering 
peer review of the tests or acceptance in an unbiased, relevant technical or 
scientific community. Id. He noted, however, that the tests would fail even 
if these factors were also considered. Id. at 556-57. 
lIS. Id. at 555-56. The Hom decision refers to the Schultz court, which listed 3S 
possible causes of HGN besides alcohol. Id. at 555-56 & n.45. See also Sch-
ultz v. State, 106 Md. App. 145, IS0-81, 664 A.2d 60,77 (1995). A few of 
these causes would seemingly be common amongst the general population, 
including: influenza, eye strain, eye muscle fatigue, excessive consumption 
of caffeine or exposure to nicotine, aspirin, some prescription drugs, he-
redity, antihistamine use, and diet. Id. 
119. 106 Md. App. at ISO, 664 A.2d at 77. 
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provides defendants with the opportunity to make the finder of fact 
aware of these alternate causes. 120 
V. MARYLAND'S FLAWED APPROACH TO STANDARDIZED 
FIELD SOBRIE1Y TESTS 
In the famous speech "The Path of the Law," Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes said: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still 
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from 
blind imitation of the past.121 
While Justice Holmes was certainly speaking before the time of en-
forcement of drunk driving laws and field sobriety tests, Maryland 
courts would be well-served to pay heed to Holmes's principle in their 
treatment of the admissibility of the results of the Standardized Field 
Sobriety Tests. In taking judicial notice of the reliability of HGN test-
ing, Maryland courts are guilty of perpetuating what other courts have 
sought to avoid. For instance, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico 
commented that the district court is required to "conduct a searching, 
de novo inquiry into the validity of the HGN FST (Field Sobriety 
Test), not to merely rubber stamp the decisions of courts in other 
jurisdictions that have admitted such evidence."122 This approach to 
the issue was not followed in Schultz v. State. 123 Because Magistrate 
Grimm conducted a more thorough, thoughtful analysis than Mary-
land state courts have, his opinion is persuasive, and his conclusions 
are indeed the correct ones. 
A. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland Erred tn Taking Judicial 
Notice of the Reliability of the Tests 
United States v. Horn revealed a plethora of evidence and testimony 
that indicate that the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests are simply not 
reliable indicators of intoxication. 124 Maryland courts, however, have 
120. 185 F. Supp. 2d at 561. Under Hom, the government may prove a connec-
tion between exaggerated HGN and intoxication in three ways: "asking the 
court to take judicial notice of it," elicitation of testimony of a qualified 
expert, or through submission of learned treatises. [d. Defendants, in tum, 
may prove there are other causes of HGN with the same tools available to 
the government'llus the additional tool of cross-examining the govern-
ment's expert. [, . 
121. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address before the Boston Uni-
versity School of Law (Jan. 8,1897), in 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). At 
the time of this speech, Mr. Justice Holmes was a judge on the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
122. State v. Lasworth, 42 P.3d 844, 850 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
123. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text. 
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either dismissed these factors or have completely failed to consider 
them when deciding the reliability of the tests. In Schultz, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland wrote: 
As we have attempted to show, the great weight of scien-
tific literature supports its reliability and the majority of juris-
dictions around the country have declared HGN testing to 
be reliable. We take judicial notice that the results of HGN 
testing, if the test is properly given by a qualified officer, are 
admissible to indicate the presence of alcohol in a 
defendant. 125 
In deciding to take judicial notice if the reliability and acceptance of 
the test, the court wrote, "We perceive that the studies, scientific arti-
cles, foreign cases, and other literature on the subject that we have 
reviewed reveal that most courts and scientific authorities have held 
the tests reliable if properly administered."126 The court, however, 
failed to mention the studies, scientific articles, and other literature it 
examined in reaching this conclusion, seemingly basing its holding on 
the research already done by other courts that Maryland chose to fol-
10w.127 This approach leaves open the possibility that unreliable testi-
mony will be presented to the finder of fact. 
Unlike the Maryland courts, Magistrate Grimm thoroughly ex-
amined all of the relevant scientific data presented by the parties in 
Horn before reaching his conclusion. 128 This difference may be based 
in part upon the two different evidentiary approaches utilized by the 
respective courts. Magistrate Grimm observed: 
Daubert requires analysis of the methodology used, its reliabil-
ity and validity. Frye, on the other hand, may tempt a court 
faced with determining the admissibility simply to see what 
other courts have done in the past, as well as review publica-
tions supplied by the parties, or found by the court's own 
efforts, without engaging in the sometimes difficult analysis 
of the reliability of the science or technology underlying 
those sources. 129 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland merely looked at what 
other courts employing the Frye standard had ruled regarding field 
sobriety tests, and followed the holding of those courts instead of in-
dependently evaluating the tests and their reliability.130 
The Court of Special Appeals also considered the practical effects of 







106 Md. App. 145, 174,664 A.2d 60, 74 (1995). 
Id. at 165, 664 A.2d 69-70. 
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text. See also Horn, 185 F. Supp. 
2d at 538-53. 
Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 552 n.39. 
See supra notes 78, 126-27 and accompanying text. 
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We note with some caution ... that, by taking judicial notice 
of the reliability of HGN testing and technique, the appellate 
court had relieved the State of its burden of establishing the 
reliability of the test at trial. We acknowledge that we, in tak-
ingjudicial notice of the reliability of the test ... are likewise 
relieving the State of that burden. We shall, nevertheless, 
take judicial notice that HGN testing, a scientific test, is suffi-
ciently reliable and generally accepted in the relevant scien-
tific community. We do so considering the great weight of 
scientific support in the literature and in light of its adoption 
in most other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. 
To do otherwise at this stage in the development of the sci-
ence would leave to individual courts within the twenty-three 
jurisdictions of this state (and the various courts and judges 
within each jurisdiction) to determine, on a case-by-case ba-
sis, the scientific reliability of the test. In each of the various 
jurisdictions, the determination of the reliability and accept-
ability of such evidence would depend upon the compe-
tence, energy, and schedules (and even the budgets) of the 
various prosecutors throughout the State in obtaining, and 
producing the attendance of experts at the thousands of tri-
als involving alcohol related offenses in which HGN testing is 
sought to be admitted. Disparate results and decisions might 
result in many instances, not from the actual scientific relia-
bility of the tests themselves, but from the differing abilities 
and resources of prosecutors and the availability of witnesses 
from the scientific community. 131 
381 
In so stating, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals eschewed the 
defendant's right to a fair trial by holding that the tests admitted 
against him are reliable and test what they purport to test. 132 In so 
doing, the court favored prosecutors, by helping them constrain their 
budgets and lightening their schedules. 
B. Horn's Response to the Maryland Approach 
The concerns of the Schultz court are indeed valid ones. Develop-
ing a simple test that facilitates an officer's ability to detect drunk driv-
ing, as well as punishing those guilty of the offense efficiently and 
inexpensively, are logical and important goals of a court. Magistrate 
Grimm agreed, writing, "The practical truth of [the Schultz court's] 
reasoning cannot be denied. . .. [I] t is highly desirable to have availa-
ble a simple, inexpensive, and reliable test that can be administered 
by police officers on the road, which would facilitate a prompt and 
inexpensive trial." 133 
131. Schultz, 106 Md. App. at 173-74, 664 A.2d at 74. 
132. See id. 
133. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 
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Magistrate Grimm, correctly, did not base his decision on these fac-
tors of efficiency and convenience, but on the constitutional guaran-
tee of a fair trail. 134 He wrote: 
What cannot be lost in the process, however, is the require-
ment that the trial be a fair one and that the sum of the 
evidence introduced against the defendant must be suffi-
ciently probative to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Expedient as it may be for courts to take judicial notice of 
scientific or technical matters to resolve the crush of DWI/ 
DUI cases, this cannot be done in the face of legitimate chal-
lenges to the reliability and accuracy of the tests sought to be 
judicially noticed. 135 
The goal of ensuring that every defendant appearing against the State 
be provided with a fair trial should be given higher priority than set-
ting standards of uniformity and efficiency-standards which make it 
easier for prosecutors to make their case against those defendants. 
While the application of the Rule 702/ Daubert/Kumho Tire standard 
may require a more searching examination of the reliability of scien-
tific and technical testimony, adoption of that standard is not re-
quired for Maryland courts to correctly decide the admissibility of 
field sobriety tests. 136 Obviously, Maryland courts are required to fol-
low the Maryland Rules of Evidence, and may therefore be precluded 
from abandoning the Frye/Reed standard. 137 Adopting the federal ap-
proach, however, is not a prerequisite for Maryland courts to reach 
the correct result. Maryland courts need to reexamine the taking of 
judicial notice of the reliability of field sobriety tests. In fact, if the 
evidence introduced in Hom were available to a court applying the 
Frye/Reed standard, it is likely that the Standardized Field Sobriety 
Tests would not be found reliable, and therefore subject to limitations 
similar to those established by Magistrate Grimm in Hom. 
134. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State"). 
135. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 550-51. Magistrate Grimm also recognized the fact 
that, if taking judicial notice of the reliability of the tests serves to preserve 
limited prosecutorial resources, the burden of refuting their admissibility 
will fall on defendants who will likely have even fewer resources at their 
disposal to challenge the tests. Id. at 550 n.36. 
136. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
137. See MD. R. 5-702. The Committee note states: "This Rule is not intended to 
overrule Reed v. State and other cases adopting the principles enunciated in 
Frye v. United States. The required scientific foundation for the admission of 
novel scientific techniques or principles is left to development through case 
law. Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
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C. The Standardized Field Sobriety Tests Do Not Satisfy the Frye/Reed 
General Acceptance Standard 
A look at Magistrate Grimm's rationale in Horn shows not only that 
the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests failed to satisfy the federal evi-
dentiary standard, but also that the Frye/Reed standard is likely not 
met. 138 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, therefore, erred in 
Schultz by taking judicial notice of the reliability of the Standardized 
Field Sobriety Tests. 
Maryland Rule 5-201(b), which governs what courts may take judi-
cial notice of, reads, "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasona-
bly be questioned."139 
Perhaps in 1995, when the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
decided Schultz, the existing research led to the conclusion that the 
field sobriety tests were reliable. However, testimonial evidence from 
Horn refutes the reliability of these tests to such an extent that reliabil-
ity no longer deserves judicial notice. 140 The fact remains, as well, 
that the Schultz court did not even consider (or at least cite to) any of 
the scientific studies regarding the tests and their reliability.141 
Instead of engaging in independent research and forming its own 
conclusions, the court, relying on a nine-year-old case, based its deci-
sion on the fact that other courts had accepted the tests as reliable.142 
The case the Schultz court relied upon was State v. Superior Court, 143 
decided by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 1986.144 In that case, the 
court wrote, "Although the publications [indicating the reliability of 
HGN testing] are not voluminous, they have been before the relevant 
communities a considerable period of time for any opposing views to 
have surfaced."145 
138. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text. 
139. MD. R. 5-201 (b) (emphasis added). See also supra note 81-82 and accompa-
nying text. 
140. See supra notes 97-120, 124 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 81-82, 123 and accompanying text. 
142. See Schultz, 106 Md. App. at 157, 664 A.2d at 66 (stating that "[t]he admissi-
bility of the results of HGN testing has been challenged in some foreign 
jurisdictions for failing to satisfy the Frye standard (or the standard adopted 
by that jurisdiction for determining the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence)"). The court noted State v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 
171 (1986), as an early case in which the test was unsuccessfully challenged. 
Id. 
143. 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz. 1986). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 181. The sources the Supreme Court of Arizona utilized in its deci-
sion can be found in appendices to the opinion at 182-84. This quoted 
passage seems to indicate that the court encountered little or no opposing 
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The Schultz court, writing in 1995, based their acceptance of HGN 
testing as reliable upon research from 1986. 14fi Judicial notice relieves 
the prosecution of its burden of proving the reliability and admissibil-
ity of the test results, even if evidence indicating the unreliability of 
the test is available. That research may still have been valid when the 
Schultz court was writing, but the testimony presented in Horn cer-
tainly calls these studies, and thus the reliability of the test, into 
question. 
Under the Frye/Reed standard, a method must have gained general 
acceptance in the relevant scientific community to be considered reli-
able. 147 However, based on expert testimony in Horn, particularly that 
of Spurgeon Cole, Ph.D.,148 one can see that Standardized Field Sobri-
ety Tests probably do not meet this standard. 149 Dr. Cole's testimony 
first challenged the validity of the tests, which is a component of gen-
eral acceptance. 150 His criticism focuses on the validity of the WAT 
and OLS tests. 151 
Looking at the reasons for the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests' 
failure under the federal standard can be instructive in showing why 
the general acceptance standard is also not satisfied. When evaluating 
whether the tests had been subjected to peer review, one of the 
Daubert factors, 152 Cole stated, "[I] t is difficult to see how the NHTSA 
could claim that the FST is accepted in the scientific community, 
when results of studies on the validation of the FST have never ap-
peared in a scientific peer reviewed journal, which is a basic require-
ment for acceptance by the scientific community."153 
views, which, in light of Hom and many other cases, obviously is not the 
case. 
146. See generally id. 
147. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. 
148. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540 (2002). Cole is a Professor Emeritus of 
Psychology at Clemson University and author of several articles on SFSTs. 
See id. at 539-40. See also http://www.c1emson.edu/psych/facuIty.html(last 
visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
149. Not meeting the Frye/Reed standard would not render the tests and their 
results inadmissible, but it would subject them to Hom-like limitations. 
150. See Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 540. Dr. Cole stated in the Defendant's Memo-
randum that the SFSTs "must be held to the same standards the scientific 
community would expect of any valid test of behavior." ld. 
151. ld. 
152. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
153. Hom, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 541. Dr. Cole concluded his testimony: 
Because of its widespread use, the FST battery has been assumed to 
be a reliable and valid predictor of driving impairment. NHTSA 
has done little to dispel that assumption .... The FST battery to be 
valid must discriminate accurately between the impaired and non-
impaired driver. NHTSA's own research on that issue ... has not 
been subjected to peer review by the scientific community. In addi-
tion, a careful reading of the reports themselves provides support 
for the inadequacy of the FST battery. 
ld. at 541-42. 
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Because the reliability of the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests has 
not been subjected to peer review, the concept has not gained general 
acceptance of the scientific community, making it unreliable even 
under a Frye/Reed analysis. 154 
A number of people within the relevant scientific community have 
expressed doubts as to the reliability of the HGN tests, showing a lack 
of general acceptance of the test's reliability. For example, in addi-
tion to Dr. Cole, three other experts offered testimony for the defen-
dant in Hom. 155 An examination of similar case law reveals several 
other courts have found Standardized Field Sobriety Tests unreliable 
indicators of intoxication.156 Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland erroneously took judicial notice of the reliability of the 
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests under the Frye/Reed general accept-
ance standard. 
D. Treatment in Other Jurisdictions 
Courts in jurisdictions using the Frye test have found the Standard-
ized Field Sobriety Tests unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible. For 
example, in Young v. City of Brookhaven, 157 the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi held that the HGN test failed the Frye analysis, as it had not 
gained acceptance in the scientific community.158 
It remains to be seen what would happen if Maryland courts reex-
amined the reliability of the HGN test. One possibility is that, after 
doing so, the court would reach the same conclusion.This, however, 
seems unlikely, assuming the examining court would actually analyze 
the existing research and correctly conclude that the results of HGN 
154. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. 
155. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 539. They are: Yale Caplan, Ph.D., the former 
chief toxicologist for the State of Maryland and former scientific director of 
the Maryland Alcohol Testing Program; Harold P. Brull, a licensed psychol-
ogist; and Joel Wiesen, Ph.D., an industrial psychologist and "independent 
consultant in the field of development and validation of human perform-
ance tests." Id. 
156. See generally State v. Garrett, 811 P.2d 488 (Idaho 1991) (holding HGN 
alone not enough to show intoxication); State v. Chastain, 960 P.2d 756 
(Kan. 1998) (holding HGN was not an accepted scientific test); Young v. 
City of Brookhaven, 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997) (holding the HGN test 
had not been accepted by the scientific community and HGN is only admis-
sible for probable cause purposes); Duffy v. Dir. of Revenue, 966 S.W.2d 
372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding HGN was not administered correctly so 
the result was excluded from evidence); State v. Torres, 976 P.2d 20 (N.M. 
1999) (holding that the State must show the reliability of the HGN test in 
order for it to be admitted into evidence). 
157. 693 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1997). 
158. Id. at 1360-61. The Young court went even farther than the Horn court did, 
holding that HGN test results were only admissible at a probable cause 
hearing, and not admissible at all at trial, stating that "[h]owever, the HGN 
test can still be used to prove probable cause to arrest and administer the 
intoxilyzer or blood test. This is the only allowable use for the test results." 
Id. at 1361. 
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testing have been called into question. The reliability of the tests have 
been refuted to the point that one can no longer maintain they meet 
the Frye/Reed standard of general acceptance within the scientific 
community. 
One indicia as to how Maryland courts would rule is to examine 
how other courts, utilizing the Frye standard, have held regarding the 
reliability of field sobriety testing. 159 One such court, the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi, ruled that the test results were not reliable be-
cause the Frye standard was not satisfied, and held the tests were only 
admissible to prove probable cause existed, and completely inadmissi-
ble for any other purpose. 160 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also ruled that the results of an 
HGN test were entirely precluded from being admitted into evidence 
in Commonwealth v. Apollo.161 In that trial, the State presented one ex-
pert who testified as to the reliability of HGN testing as an indicator of 
intoxication. 162 The court held that this testimony did not meet the 
general acceptance requirement of Fry; 63 because it was based in part 
upon the expert's personal observations and views, and the trial court 
had been confronted with evidence that indicated that the tests were 
not reliable. 164 
Faced with the same issue, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, utilizing 
the Frye standard, reached a conclusion similar to that of the Horn 
court. 165 In State v. Baue, the Nebraska court ruled that the Frye test 
was satisfied, but limited the purpose for which the results of HGN 
testing could be admitted into evidence to establishing that the defen-
dant may have been intoxicated. 166 The court went on to state that 
159. The discussion here will center around the Frye standard, as this is the 
method of evaluating scientific evidence currently used by Maryland (and 
many other states) courts, and in light of the language of the Committee 
note to MD. R. 5-702. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
160. See Young, 693 So. 2d at 1360-61 (Miss. 1997). See also supra notes 140-41 
and accompanying text. The Young court did not explain the reasoning 
behind its holding that the tests were unreliable. 
161. 603 A.2d 1023 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
162. [d. at 1027. The expert was a behavioral optometrist who evaluated eye 
health and visual performance. [d. 
163. Frye was adopted as the applicable standard by Pennsylvania state courts in 
Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977). See Apollo, 603 A.2d at 
1026. 
164. Apollo, 603 A.2d at 1028. The court concluded: "Under these circum-
stances, we cannot say that the lower court abused its discretion when it 
precluded the admission at trial of any evidence concerning the administra-
tion to appellant of the HGN test or of the results of that test." [d. 
165. State v. Baue, 607 N.W.2d 191 (Neb. 2000). 
166. [d. at 204. The court wrote: 
[W]e hold that the HGN field sobriety test meets the Frye standard 
for acceptance in the relevant scientific communities, and when 
the test is given in cortiunction with other field sobriety tests, the 
results are admissible for the limited purpose of establishing that a 
person has an impairment which may be caused by alcohol. 
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while the results of HGN testing are relevant, the results of the test are 
not enough to prove that a defendant is guilty of driving under the 
influence of akohol.167 In State v. Chastain,168 the Supreme Court of 
Kansas considered expert testimony,169 and still concluded that HGN 
testing did not satisfy the Frye standard. 170 
In light of the jurisdictions that apply the Frye standard and have 
either concluded that HGN testing does not meet the standard, or 
have limited the purposes for which the test could be used, it is evi-
dent that the issue should be reexamined by Maryland courts. Horn 
revealed a plethora of evidence that casts doubt upon the reliability of 
the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests in general, and the HGN test 
specifically.l71 Considering this testimony, it is difficult to continue to 
recognize the reliability of the tests and their results. It is also difficult 
to understand how Maryland courts can ignore the existing research, 
relieving the state of its burden of proving the reliability of questiona-
ble science, by taking judicial notice of the reliability of the tests. 
E. How Should Maryland State Courts Treat the Standardized Field Sobriety 
Tests When it Comes to Admitting Their Results into Evidence? 
Because of the thorough analysis of Magistrate Grimm in Horn, 
which considered all of the relevant scientific research available, one 
can only reach the conclusion that a standard employing similar limi-
tations on the testimony regarding a defendant's performance on a 
field sobriety test is the correct one. Properly conducted Standardized 
Field Sobriety Tests can be used to determine whether probable cause 
existed to charge a driver with DWI or DUI, but may not be used to 
prove a specific BAC. 172 A court may take judicial notice of the con-
nection between HGN and intoxication, but the defense should be 
given the opportunity to point out that this relationship is by no 
means exclusive.173 Finally, an arresting officer may offer lay opinion 
testimony of first hand observations of the defendant taking the tests, 
admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication, but may not use 
conclusory language such as "fail" or "standardized clues" while testify-
ing. 174 Only when similar limitations are placed upon the admissibil-
ity of the test results in Maryland state courts will defendants accused 











960 P.2d 756 (Kan. 1998). 
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
Chastain, 960 P.2d at 761 (stating that the court was "not satisfied that such 
testing has achieved general acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community") . 
See supra notes 85-120 and accompanying text. 
Ham, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 532-34. 
Id. 
Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Drunk driving is a very serious problem in the United States ta-
day.175 The role of the courts in correcting this problem is to see that 
those guilty of driving while intoxicated are punished for their ac-
tions. In achieving this goal, courts must apply the proper evidentiary 
standard when determining the admissibility of field sobriety tests. 
Maryland and federal courts have reached two different conclusions 
as to the admissibility of these tests. 
Regardless of which standard is applied, the holding of United States 
v. Hom-that the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests cannot be used to 
prove a specific BAC, or even as direct evidence of intoxication, but 
only as circumstantial evidence of intoxication-is correct.176 This 
type of evidence is subject to even further limitations. l77 The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, in Schultz v. State, chose to ignore studies 
that have disputed the accuracy and reliability of Standardized Field 
Sobriety Tests by taking judicial notice of their accuracy.178 Because 
of the shaky footing upon which judicial notice was taken in Schultz, 
the conclusion that the reliability of the Standardized Field Sobriety 
Tests has reached "general acceptance" within the scientific commu-
nity is faulty, and Maryland courts should adopt an approach similar 
to that in United States v. Hom. 
Rick M. Grams 
175. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 
176. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra notes 85-117 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
